Abstract-Wireless LAN systems (WLAN) are intrinsically vulnerable to various jamming attacks. The recently released 802.11ac protocol standardizes beamforming which is susceptible to new types of jamming attacks. We summarize those attacks and provide a proof-of-concept based implementation for one very efficient such attack. As far as we know, there has not been any previous work done using the beamforming mechanism as a jamming attack vector. We have used a 802.11ac Access Point (AP) along with a commercially available 802.11ac Netgear (A6200) client, both capable of beamforming. For the jammer, we used a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP2) Software Defined Radio (SDR). We show that jamming the beamforming mechanism is very effective in reducing the aggregate throughput of the targeted WLAN. Furthermore, we also show that the effects of jamming the beamforming mechanism in a Multi User Multiple Input Multiple Output (MU-MIMO) environment can bring the throughput down to a small fraction of its maximum potential.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 802.11 standards have repeatedly been criticized for their lack of comprehensive security solutions that protect the entities in the WLAN and also secure the medium. In August 2001 [1] , the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security mechanism was broken and has been deprecated from 2004 onwards. Even with stronger security mechanisms like WiFi Protected Access (WPA) and WPA2 being implemented, the control and management overhead required for the proper functioning of the WLAN still faced the threat of being used as an attack vector in jamming. Wireless networks are inherently susceptible to incidental and dedicated jamming. Devices such as microwave ovens, which share the 2.4 Ghz Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) radio band can cause interference. Jamming can also be implemented with malicious intentions by entities are known as jammers [2] .
The latest member of the 802.11 family is the 802.11ac standard [3] , which was published in January, 2014. This standard incorporates the first ever implementation of gigabit wireless speeds, known as Very High Throughput (VHT), along with a standardized method for beamforming. This 802.11 beamforming mechanism [4] [3] is based on the sounding signal sent by the beamformer to the beamformee. This signal is susceptible to jamming, and it is this phenomenon that we explore in this paper. As far as we know, this is the first implementation where beamforming is considered as an attack vector for jamming, and almost certainly, the first such attack on the 802.11ac protocol. The 802.11w amendment to the 802.11 standard which was published in September 2009 [5] protects the management frames. The beamforming feature of 802.11ac [3] which uses management frames, was left out of this protection mechanism. We show that jamming the WLAN beamforming mechanism substantially reduces the throughput in the network. Since future performance improvements of WLAN architecture generally includes MU-MIMO, we will also show this jamming attack compounds these effects for MU-MIMO. The results in this paper also apply to military communications since these communications must also adopt beamforming to improve performance without increasing bandwidth.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II surveys some WLAN jamming attacks. Then, in Section III, the new 802.11ac standard is introduced. Section IV discusses beamforming. Section V gives an overview of the jamming attacks which can be done on beamforming. In Section VI, we describe the equipment setup and experiments. Experimental data is analyzed in Section VII and conclusions drawn in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND ON JAMMING
Malicious jammers are broadly classified into two categories; jammers with and without the knowledge of the Media Access Control (MAC) layer protocol. The former category includes constant, periodic and random jammers [6] . The jammers falling in the later category mostly spoof or corrupt MAC layer frames by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the inherent working of the MAC layer protocol. They are also called as reactive [7] or intelligent [8] jammers. We look at three main types used to jam the 802.11 protocol.
Identity Attacks use Management type frames [4] and include deauthentication and disassociation attacks and the attack on the power saving mechanism [2] . A deauthentication or a disassociation attack can disconnect a legitimate station from a basic service set, thus denying it access the network resources. In the power save mechanism, a client polls the Access Point (AP) to retrieve stored frames. By spoofing the polling message, an attacker can cause the AP to discard the buffered packets when the client is still asleep [2] .
Media Access Attacks focus on denying medium access to legitimate wireless clients by exploiting the channel access mechanisms. The 802.11 standard and 802.11e standard [9] define inter-frame spacings for prioritizing channel access for the wireless stations. Short Interval Frame Spacing (SIFS) and Distributed Coordination Function Inter-frame Space (DIFS) are the two most important ones. An attacker may completely disable the channel by sending a short signal after every SIFS or DIFS period [2] . A jammer might also gain access to the channel by selecting smaller average back-off values in the DCF mechanism, and/or by using a different strategy for selecting a back-off window after a collision [10] . A jammer can effectively Fig. 1 . VHT Format Preamble [11] create a Denial of Service (DOS) attack on the medium by spoofing RTS or CTS frames with large NAV values (maximum is 32ms [2] ).
Intelligent Jamming attacks mostly involve sniffing the wireless traffic and reacting to it by corrupting specific frames to void an entire transaction. CTS, Acknowledgement (ACK) and Data corruption attacks fall into this category [8] .
III. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF 802.11AC
Conceptually, 802.11ac [3] is an evolved standard from 802.11n [4] . Most of the techniques, which are in 802.11n, are just refined in 802.11ac with two exceptions. The 802.11ac MU-MIMO technique is entirely new to the 802.11 family. Also, 802.11ac supports ONLY the 5 Ghz frequency band since it allows 80 Mhz and 160 Mhz channels, whereas 2.4 Ghz does not support those channel widths. 802.11ac defines the maximum number of spatial streams as eight, doubling from 802.11n. Modulation and coding schemes (MCS), in 802.11ac decouple the MCS rate from the number of spatial streams and channel bandwidth. Also, 802.11ac introduces 256-QAM that increases the PHY layer speed by 33%. A new error code, Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) gives 1-2 dB gain. Only one type of PHY preamble ( Fig. 1 ) is defined and an improved Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) scheme has been introduced that supports BSSs on channels in the same locality. A per packet dynamic bandwidth feature has been introduced.
IV. BEAMFORMING IN 802.11AC
Traditionally Access Points (APs) have omnidirectional antennas but beamforming techniques that channelize the energy in one direction and increases signal strength can be used. The device that does the beamforming is the beamformer and the receiver is the beamformee. The beamformed data goes from the beamformer to the beamformee. In 802.11ac, beamforming gains are expected to be 3 to 4 dB. This corresponds to an increase of one MCS rate for a mid-range transmission. The 802.11n standard had seldom implemented multiple methods of beamforming, but, very importantly, 802.11ac has defined only explicit beamforming. Beamforming depends on a channel calibration procedure, called channel sounding [3] , which is used to determine how to radiate energy in a preferred direction. The following four frames are used for beamforming.
The Null Data Packet Announcement (NDPA) initiates the process and sets its duration field to the total time taken for the sounding procedure. The Null Data Packet (NDP) is basically a Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (PLCP) preamble. In the NDP frame, Fig. 2 , there is one VHT-LTF for each spatial stream used in transmission. Beamforming Report Poll Frame (BRPF) is used exclusively in Multi User beamforming to poll the beamformees for the Compressed Beamforming Feedback [12] Matrix (CBFM). The Compressed Beamforming Action Frame (CBAF) sent by a beamformee to the beamformer contains the feedback matrix that the beamformer uses to calculate the steering matrix.
A. NDP explicit beamforming sounding procedure
The beamformer transmits an NDPA frame to gain control of the channel and make the beamformees ready to receive the NDP frame. Then the beamformer sends the NDP frame which is received by each beamformee. Each OFDM subcarrier in the training field of the NDP frame is processed independently with its own matrix that describes the performance of the subcarrier between each transmitter antenna element and each receiver antenna element based on the received signal power and phase shifts between each pair of antennas. This matrix is transformed by Givens rotations. The beamformee calculates the angles based on the matrix rotations. This compressed feedback matrix (contains angles) is returned to the beamformer. One set of angles (quite large for wider channels) is required for each OFDM subcarrier to describe the radio link performance. The three main factors that determine the size of the feedback matrix are channel width, number of pairwise combinations of transmitter and receiver antennas and angle resolution. Each beamformee sends a feedback matrix. Then the beamformer uses the feedback matrix to calculate the steering matrix for transmissions to the beamformee. Matrix operations allow the spatial mapper to alter the signal to be transmitted for each OFDM subcarrier over each path to the receiver in one operation. After applying the steering matrix to the data for transmission, it leaves the antenna array creating a 'beam' towards the beamformee. 
B. Single and Multi User Beamforming
The packet exchange for Single User (SU) beamforming is done every 30 ms [12] and is shown in Fig 3. The beamformer sends the NDPA notifying the beamformee (by including the AID of that beamformee), that an NDP frame will follow. It sends the NDP frame after a SIFS interval. The beamformee calculates the steering matrix and the coefficients are sent back in the CBAF. Then the beamformer applies the angles to the spatial streams and sends the subsequent data packet. The Multi User beamforming procedure is similar to SU beamforming except after the first client has responded with a CBAF, the beamformer polls the next beamformee (Fig. 4) . For a MU-MIMO system, the computation for the steering matrix is Fig. 4 . Multi User beamforming sounding mechanism [12] slightly different. The beamformees report the ratio of the SNRs of the subcarriers in the MU Exclusive Beamforming Report field. These are included in the steering matrix calculation, so that the beamformer can pre-code before sending the data. This is done to reduce the interference for two beamformees close to each other. The working of MU-MIMO depends on how well the Space Division Multiple Access (SDMA) works in separating the individual beams. This allows the beamformer to transmit multiple frames simultaneously; see Fig. 5 . The Block Ack Request (BAR) frames are sent by the beamformer to the beamformees and they reply with a Block Ack (BA) frame as an Acknowledgement for the receipt of the data frame. 
V. JAMMING ATTACKS ON BEAMFORMING
Beamforming is vulnerable to jamming of the NDP calibration frame which has no Frame Check Sequence (FCS) equivalent. Also, the control frames (NDPA and BRPF), and management frames (CBAF) do not have any encryption, so they can be spoofed. The NDPA control packet is sent out at a legacy rate so that all the clients (legacy and otherwise) can create a NAV and defer any transmissions. These lead to beamforming vulnerabilities as follows. Jamming an NDPA frame will essentially stop the beamforming mechanism from ever taking place. This frame can be used as a trigger to jam other packets in this sounding sequence. Jamming the NDP frame might be the most effective since it is used for multiple clients, and by jamming/scrambling the bits in this frame, all beamformees will be affected. Jamming the CBAF would be effective against a single beamformee, but is not as efficient as jamming an NDP frame in a MU-MIMO scenario. Another vulnerability is spoofing the NDPA frame. It contains a duration field, which gives the time required for the entire sounding sequence. Spoofing such a frame with large duration field values will set large NAV vectors in other clients, thus creating a DOS of the medium. Since the CBAF is not included under the replay protection mechanism found in 802.11w [5] , it can be captured and replayed. This type of attack will be most useful when the beamformee is mobile and moving, since the stale 'angle' values will train the beamformer antennas in an 'old' direction. This attack has the potential to reduce the throughput dramatically since the beamformer will direct the signal to the wrong direction. We are going to jam the NDP frames because this attack will affect all the clients in the network (as opposed to the beamforming compressed report replay attack). We show, with an actual implementation, that such a jamming attack on the NDP frame considerably reduces throughput in the network.
VI. SETUP AND IMPLEMENTATION
At the outset of this work, the official 802.11ac standard had not been released, and only a couple of 802.11ac draft compliant hardware devices were available in the market. Also, as far as we know, no simulators for 802.11ac exist. At this point, Broadcom Corporation graciously agreed to let us have an 802.11ac draft compliant AP for this work. We secured an 802.11ac reference board AP from them. We also got a commercially available Netgear (A6200) card [13] which we used as a client. The Netgear client was chosen since it is commercially available, so that our implementation would be largely platform agnostic and would highlight the weaknesses of the 802.11ac standard. implementation. The GNURadio software runs on the host machine and controls the USRP2s. A machine acting as a wireless sniffer is used for creating packet traces of the wireless environment by sniffing in monitor mode. An 802.11ac AP is connected to the wired interface of the Wireshark sniffer via Ethernet. Similarly, two USRP2s are connected to the host machine via Ethernet.
The USRP2 [14] , by Ettus Research LLC serves as a digital baseband and Intermediate Frequency (IF) section of a radio communication system with modulation and demodulation of the signal done on the machine's CPU. Only the high-speed general-purpose operations like Digital Up Conversion (DUC) and Digital Down Conversion (DDC) are done on the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) residing on the USRP2. All other complex baseband signal handling is done on a general purpose computer. The USRP2 platform has a Xilinx Spartan 3-2000 FPGA, a Gigabit Ethernet interface, two 100 Million samples/sec, 14-bit analog-to-digital converters (LTC2284), two 400 Million samples/sec, 16-bit digital-to-analog converters (AD9777) and a SD card reader. The USRP2 used has a XCVR 2450 daughterboard [15] installed on it that acts as a RF front end. It has Dual-band Transceiver capabilities with 100+mW output at 2.4-2.5 GHz and 50+mW output at 4.9-5.85 GHz. We used two USRP2 SDRs along with GNURadio running on a host PC machine to create our own 'jammer'. One USRP2 serves as a receiver and recognizes the trigger NDPA packet that we use for jamming NDP frame, and the other USRP2 is designed to jam. It is not necessary nor is it possible for the USRP2 to sense and process all of the 802.11ac packets but The correct placement of all the equipment is very important for the experiment. The jammer USRP2 is kept near the beamformee (client + Netgear card) with a low transmit power, so as not to disturb the reception of the USRP2 sniffer kept near the 802.11ac AP. The client itself is kept at a point where the received signal from the AP is just strong enough to pass MCS8 rate traffic. We used low transmit power on both the AP and the client since they were not very far apart. We use Xubuntu 12.04 on the host machine and USRP Hardware Driver (UHD)(version 003.005.004). We then installed GNURadio version 3.7.1-52 [16] and integrated Vector Optimized Library of Kernels (VOLK) [17] as suggested by the creators of GNURadio. This gives a huge boost in performance by using Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions.
A. Access Point, Client and Wireshark Sniffer setup
The Broadcom AP with preinstalled binary firmware and driver (version 6.37.15) is available with Broadcom chipsets inside devices available on the market. We set the AP to 20 Mhz since the USRP2s are not able to handle more than 20 Mhz of bandwidth. All control and management frames are sent at 6 Mbps 'basic' legacy rate. This enables the USRP2 to successfully receive almost all the packets. We also reduced the unnecessary traffic sent by the AP. The client is a Windows 7 machine with the Netgear A6200 card [13] . We disabled many unnecessary traffic generating services in Windows 7 and connected the client to the basic service set up on the AP. The Wireshark sniffer machine used a Broadcom 802.11ac card. We installed it on a MiniPCI-E to PCI-E adapter that lets us mount the card on the sniffer machine motherboard. Then we installed Linux (Fedora core 15) and the Broadcom driver, and the latest Wireshark version. The key function of this machine is to sniff and decode 802.11ac frames.
B. Implementation
For jamming the NDP frame, the basic piece of knowledge we require is when it will be transmitted. Since the NDP frame is transmitted a SIFS interval after NDPA frame, we designed a jammer system that could detect the NDPA frame so we could jam the NDP frame. First, we required an OFDM receiver capable of demodulating and decoding a 20 Mhz signal with 64 subcarriers. We found an OFDM receiver implemented in GNURadio that runs on USRP2 [18] . However, it was not able to receive and decode all the packets it sniffed because it was a software implementation of a OFDM receiver. Hence, we removed the extra wireless traffic and chose channel 165 (5.825 Ghz) since there was no background traffic on that channel. We decoded the MAC header and if the frame was an NDPA frame we jammed the NDP frame. However, this approach was too slow since GNURadio creates threads for every block and we often missed the NDP frames. We then realized we could determine the frame being sent based on the length subfield in the SIGNAL field of the PLCP header since it was the only frame of this length seen. Therefore, we removed the 'OFDM Decode MAC', 'OFDM Parse MAC' and 'Socket PDU' blocks from the OFDM receiver. Then we built a jammer as shown in Fig. 7 . The main function of the OFDM Decode Signal block [18] is to recognize the SIGNAL field from the PLCP header (since it is only a single OFDM symbol), and extract the length and modulation information of the following OFDM symbols in the frame. This block processes one OFDM symbol at a time. The 'trigger block' (Fig. 7) is basically a modified OFDM Decode Signal block such that it outputs a '1' if it detects an NDPA frame (based on the length sent at 6 Mbps), it outputs a '0' for all other symbols. With this implementation, we have a trigger mechanism that recognizes the NDPA frame being put on the channel.
The next part was to generate the jamming signal. We do this by first repeating the '1's and '0's (output of the 'trigger block') 512 times each. This number had to be a multiple of 64 since we do a 64 point Fourier Transform. We 'AND' these with a random signal to generate a stream which has 512 random numbers and the rest are '0's. Note that we are generating a random stream or essentially noise but we show this was adequate to distort the NDP packet and corrupt the angles generated by the beamformee. Additionally, noise is very hard to detect, and is subtle and efficient. This stream is given as input to 'Int to Float' block that converts the incoming integer values to floating point values. These are then fed into a 'Float to Complex' block which takes real and imaginary streams as input and generates complex numbers by combining them. Next, these are fed to a 64 point Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT) block which outputs 64 samples. This corresponds to the 64 subcarriers used in the OFDM transmission and reception in 802.11a. Next, these are fed to a 'constant multiplier' block that multiplies the input sample by '10000' to increase the amplitude of the signal. This block is necessary, since, as we previously mentioned, the transmit gain of the jammer USRP2 has to be such that the sniffer USRP2 is not compromised in receiving and decoding the OFDM symbols. This ensures that the amplitude of the output signal of USRP2 is high when jamming is required (when non-zero random stream is created), and zero (when zero stream is created) when it is not. Thus the jammer is not always on.
The IFFT block essentially generates samples of zero magnitude when it does an IFFT on 64 samples, each having a zero magnitude. Hence, the constant multiplier block output also has zero magnitude only for such samples. This stream of numbers is then passed onto an interpolation block which is setup to generate 10 8 output samples per input sample. This is then fed to the transmitter USRP2 block that interpolates the samples as required to get a rate of 20 Msps and then transmits on channel 165. The values for the repeat block (i.e. 512), and the interpolation block (10 × 10 −9 ) are related. We reached these numbers empirically, since lowering the number of samples sent to the transmitter USRP2 block gives an 'Underflow' message, while sending more than it can handle gives the 'Overflow' message. We also inserted a delay block after the 'trigger block' to make sure that the jamming signal being sent overlaps the exact transmission of the NDP frame without jamming other frames. After experimenting with different values of the delay block, we realized that the best reading was achieved by setting the delay as zero, i.e. no delay.
After setting up the jammer, we started downlink traffic by simply pinging the wireless client from the AP. After much testing and tweaking we realized that Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets are not beamformed by the AP. Hence, we needed a traffic generating tool. We used 'iperf' and generated User Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic that went from the wired interface of the sniffer machine to the AP, which relayed the packets on the wireless medium to the client. We generated the wireless sniffer traces for the observations as follows. First, we just generate the downlink traffic, sniff it and save the trace. Then we turn on the NDP frame jammer and again sniff the medium and save the trace. We expect that the NDP frames will be jammed enough so that the client (beamformee) will read them and infer incorrect angles, which it then sends back to the AP (beamformer) in the CBAF. The AP will use these angles, generate the steering matrix and not steer the 'beam' as expected. This will reduce the effective SNR of the AP's power at the client, thus making the AP reduce its MCS rate. This will significantly affect the downlink throughput. Hence we can say that the jamming has been effective.
VII. READINGS AND OBSERVATIONS
First we will see how enabling and disabling beamforming affects the rate at which packets are sent from the beamformer to the beamformee. We send downlink traffic to the client generated using iperf on the sniffer machine's wired interface [ Fig. 6 ]. Table I shows the rates at which the packets are sent and received with and without beamforming. This table has been generated from the information retrieved on the AP console and shows the number of transmitted packets for every MCS rate from the AP's perspective. When there is no beamforming, 59.86%, 39.96% and only 0.18% of the packets are sent at MCS 7, MCS 8 and MCS 9 respectively. When beamforming is turned on, the picture changes completely with 0.21% and 99.79% of the packets sent at MCS 8 and MCS 9 respectively. This increase in MCS rate is due to higher SNR and consequently lower BER. It does not depend upon the packet size or aggregation or any other parameter. Please note that since we need to prove a significant increase in throughput only due to beamforming, we have made sure that the restrictions previously mentioned on the client and the AP (like channel bandwidth of 20 Mhz), have been removed. The number shown in Table I is not only the UDP packets, but all the packets the AP beamformed. The throughput shown by the iperf software is 20 Mbps without beamforming and 35 Mbps with beamforming. We can clearly see a large increase in throughput when beamforming is turned ON, even with the beamforming overhead. For a single client sounding sequence, the overhead is about 1% of the airtime [12] . With the maximum of four clients (MU-MIMO limit), this overhead increases to about 4%. Hence, the MU-MIMO system excels by sending data downlink to up to four clients in the same frame 'air time' for a nearly 400% increase. If we can jam the beamforming process, this efficiency increase will not be possible. Now, we compare the readings with and without jamming. Table II shows the readings for the number of packets transferred at 802.11ac and 802.11n rates. (Please note that since we had to use the USRP2s, the previous restrictions of channel bandwidth to 20 Mhz have been enforced again). Two trials 6.77% of the packets sent with jamming turned ON are being beamformed. This should ideally be 0% but since we have imperfect synchronization of the jamming processes, and the fact that we are using random noise to jam the NDP frames, this result is expected. Hence, a few jammed NDP frames did not change the 'angles' enough to destroy beamforming.
We can see that the number of retried UDP packets are not much different in both scenarios. This assures us that the jamming signal did not 'step over' or jam the UDP packets themselves. Thus, we can say that the AP was not forced to lower its modulation scheme because the transmission of the previous packet failed. Also, examining the traces, we can see that the CBAFs sent by the beamformee does not show any retransmissions, thus confirming that the jamming signal is indeed jamming only the NDP frames. The difference in the readings when comparing Table II and Table III is due to the fact that the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) of the beamformer at beamformee varies. This, coupled with 'the not perfectly synchronized jammer', gives rise to the discrepancy. In order to show jamming accounts for the change in the MCS rates as well as the UDP packets not getting beamformed, we now verify that the NDP frame was getting jammed. This can be done by dissecting the CBAF sent by the beamformee. Since we have captured the traces, we analyzed them deduced facts about the AP-client connection which we verified by cross checking with the specifications and the AP configuration. The AP transmitted on three antennas and the Netgear card received on two, with two spatial streams. Therefore, the feedback matrix for every subcarrier was N r × N c = 3 × 2 with the number of angles N a = 6 [3] . This gave us the angles φ11,φ21, ψ21, ψ31, φ22 and ψ32 inserted in that order in the packet for 52 subcarriers. By examining the VHT MIMO control field, we see that every φ angle is described using 6 bits. This means that we can have (2 6 = 64) different quantized values for φ which lie between 0 to 2π. Similarly, ψ is described using 4 bits and hence can take (2 4 = 16) different values from 0 to π/2. Let us consider, as an example, the φ21 angle. After obtaining all the CBAFs, we scan through them to obtain the φ21 values for every subcarrier for every packet. These are then aggregated for each subcarrier for all 400 sniffed packets. At this stage, we have groups of data, with each group corresponding to one subcarrier, and the data points in that group are the φ21 values for every packet. Then we take the mean and the standard deviation for φ21 of the 400 packets, the 52 subchannels yeilding 52 mean and standard deviation values. This explanation is for φ21, but each angle mentioned above has its own 52 sets of values. This method is repeated for the trace generated before jamming and the one generated during jamming. Fig. 8 shows the graphs drawn from that data. For all the graphs, the X-axis represents the 52 OFDM subcarriers. In Fig. 8a and 8b , the values plotted are the average values of φ21 generated from the trace before and during jamming. A 26 point moving average is shown by the red line. It shows the trend of the mean of that graph across 52 subcarriers. Fig. 8c shows the difference between values of every subcarrier in graphs given by Figs. 8a and 8b. This shows that there is significant difference between the mean of φ21 angle values before and during jamming and that jamming affects the beamforming angles. Fig. 8d shows the absolute difference between the means of φ21 before and during jamming. In this figure, the 26 point moving average is about 8, which means that the value of φ21 has changed by a margin of 8/64 (since φ21 can be quantized to 64 different values), on an average for every subcarrier. Similar plots and analysis can be put forth for φ11, ψ31, φ22 and ψ32. An example, the graphs for φ22 and ψ32 (Fig. 8) show the absolute difference in the mean before and during jamming. Similar results for these and all the other angles show that jamming is indeed changing the preamble values in the NDP frame received enough to generally make beamforming at best marginal. Fig. 9 shows the same results as Fig. 8c except the trace packet readings have been separated into four time sequential packet traces. Four 26 point moving averages for groups of 100 each show the trend for each group separately. This is done to prove the consistency of jamming results across time. Thus, we can ascertain that all the angles sent in the CBAFs are similar and consistent. The conclusion from all of these calculations and graphs, coupled with the number of UDP packets not getting beamformed due to jamming, creates compelling evidence that jamming the NDP frame has indeed almost completely stopped the beamforming mechanism, though currently without access to the firmware source code we have not been able to determine why. However, beamforming is likely stopped when the MCS rate with beamforming fall below the rate without beamforming as demonstated by our results. The experimental results show that jamming the NDP frame reduces the throughput because the AP does not beamform them at all, or it sends the data packets by beamforming at a lower MCS rate. This is almost equivalent to turning off the beamforming feature itself. As seen before, the decrease in throughput after turning off beamforming is from 35 Mbps to 20 Mbps. On calculating the percentage decrease in throughput, we can see that on an average the throughput decreases by 42.85%. The results at NCSU lab were replicated at Broadcom Corporation and the decrease there was 31.6%.
Let us see how this effect is compounded for a MU-MIMO system. In Fig. 5 , for three clients associated to an AP, the AP sends a data frame to each of the three clients in one 'time frame'. Since MU-MIMO beamformed transmissions depend entirely on beamforming, jamming the NDP frame will result in the AP sending the data frames to each client sequentially since it cannot beamform and do simultaneous transmissions. Thus the data transmissions will take approximately three times longer than if beamforming to individual clients were used. This implies the throughput will decrease to 1/3 of the beamformed throughput. This means that jamming the NDP frame will be very effective in reducing the throughput in a MU-MIMO scenario. This is in addition to the fact that all of the data will be transmitted at a lower rate.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have created a proof-of-concept setup for exploiting a vulnerability that exists in explicit beamforming, the only beamforming mechanism in 802.11ac. A single method has been done to implement MU-MIMO topologies to increase the overall downlink throughput from the AP to the clients. Since MU-MIMO relies on the beamforming mechanism, jamming it effectively stops the MU-MIMO beamformed transmissions and reduces the throughput in the network to approximately 1/n of beamformed users. Also, this jamming will be very difficult to detect since it is infrequent, always transmitted during other traffic, is different on each transmission, and largely noise which makes it very effective.
This vulnerability might possibly be mitigated by using the preambles in the data frames themselves for calculating the feedback matrix. This matrix can be returned to the beamformer by piggybacking onto some other frame. Implementation of this kind of mitigation is left as a part of future work.
The trend of the 802.11 standards, shows the beamforming mechanism and MU-MIMO will play critical role in increasing the throughput in future wireless deployments. 802.11ad is the standard for Gigabit throughput speed in 60 Ghz band which uses beamforming for increasing throughput. This is also seen in 802.11af standard which brings WLAN operation in TV spectrum (Ultra High Frequency and Very High Frequency bands). Our work is very fundamental in its approach since beamforming is a key to improving throughput in the future WLAN deployments via the concept of Spatial Division Multiplexing (SDM), which somewhat resembles switching in wired networks.
